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Abortion laws have regulated women’s bodies since the beginning of the country. Many 
people associate regulation with the case of Roe V. Wade in 1973, in which the Supreme 
Court ruled that states could not outlaw abortion during the first trimester. Roe v. Wade 
remains controversial to this day as it failed to establish consensus that women’s decision 
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy falls within their constitutional right to privacy. 
Understanding the implications of this decision is fundamental to analyze the debate over the 
constitutionality of abortion today. This paper examines the opinion written by Justice 
Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, by examining the reasoning behind his decision as well as the 
man behind the decision. In addition to examining the pivotal role of Justice Blackmun, this 
paper looks at the impact his decision had in shaping reproductive freedom in the future. To 
do this, the paper summarizes previous research on Supreme Court cases post Roe that 
presented additional arguments on the constitutionality of abortion regulation. I additionally 
summarize the examination of multiple Supreme Court cases regarding the constitutionality 
of abortion regulation. Justice Blackmun paved the way to expanding women’s right to make 
their own reproductive decisions by interpreting this as part of the right to privacy, but his 
decision did not go far enough. Because Justice Blackmun’s decision allowed for competing 
interpretations, women’s reproductive rights were not securely guaranteed, as subsequent 
Supreme Court rulings on abortion demonstrated. The paper concludes that many justices 
and legislators have denied the right to privacy that Justice Blackmun spelled out in Roe, 
supporting the infringement on women’s rights by preventing women from having abortions 
or access to contraceptives.  I use the Roe decision to examine the constitutionally of the 
current restrictions being placed on women’s bodies and argue that these laws and 
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regulations against women infringe on their ability to participate equally in society, limiting 
their rights as citizens. 
I. Introduction 
Women’s bodies have been legislated for years. The Supreme Court decided in 
Muller v. Oregon (1908) that women – unlike men – could not work more than ten hours a day 
since this could presumably jeopardize their health and reproductive ability. Until 1965, laws 
denied married women the right to use contraceptives and it was not until 1972 that unmarried 
women gained this right. Until Roe V. Wade (1973), state laws made it a felony for a woman to 
get an abortion. This has created tension between a women’s right to regulate her individual 
fertility and reproduction and the state’s interest in maintaining a healthy, growing population. 
This state interest has been historically reflected in the laws and strong social norms that specify 
women’s primary roles in terms of childbearing, child rearing and motherhood. Post Roe, I have 
found that the law continues to regulate many aspects of American women's lives and restricts 
their reproductive freedom. In Supreme Court cases regarding reproductive freedom, many 
justices have supported the infringement of women’s rights by restricting their access to safe and 
affordable abortions as well as their access to contraceptives.  
There have been major improvements and large setbacks in reproductive rights since the 
1960s. Many people argue that women’s rights are no longer a pressing issue as abortion has 
been legal for decades. However, it is unfortunately not that simple.  Katha Pollitt argues, “It is 
inaccessible-too far away, too expensive to pay for out of pocket, and too encumbered by 
restrictions and regulations and humiliations, many of which might not seem to be one of those 
“undue burdens” the Supreme Court has ruled are impermissible curbs on a woman’s ability to 
 4 
terminate a pregnancy, but which, taken together, do place abortion out of reach.”1 American 
society would not accept extensive restrictions on any other constitutional rights, as we do 
towards women’s reproductive rights. Despite the fact that American society has increasingly 
accepted expanded rights for minorities and same-sex couples, it remains deeply divided over 
women’s reproductive rights, as shown by increasing legal restrictions on women’s bodies. 
Gallup shows that sixty-six percent of Americans now support same-sex marriage, which is the 
highest support since the question was first asked in 1996.2  Another public opinion poll 
demonstrates the public progression toward same-sex marriage but not toward abortion, “From 
1972 to 2006, the percentage of General Social Survey (GSS) respondents who said premarital 
sex was “not wrong at all” rose from 28 to 46. The percentage who said gay sex was “not wrong 
at all” tripled, from 11 to 32 percent. But the abortion numbers didn’t follow. From the 1970s to 
2006, the percentage of GSS respondents who said it should be possible for a woman to get a 
legal abortion shifted two points to the left in cases where the woman “wants it for any reason,” 
six points to the right in cases of a “strong chance of serious defect in the baby,” and seven 
points to the right in cases where the family “cannot afford any more children.” By 2006, the last 
year these questions were asked, only a minority supported legal abortion in the “any reason” or 
“can’t afford” scenarios”.3 I argue that regulations against women’s reproductive freedom 
infringe on their ability to participate equally in society, limiting their rights as citizens.  I further 
                                                        
1 Katha Pollitt. Pro Reclaiming Abortion as Good for Society. (New York, New York: Picador, 
2014), 25. 
2 Justin, McCarthy. "Record-High 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage." Gallup. 
Accessed July 17, 2016. http://www.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-support-sex-
marriage.aspx. 
3 William Saletan. "Why Are We Becoming More Liberal on Homosexuality but Not Abortion?" 




hold that Supreme Court decisions that uphold restrictions on abortion enacted by some state 
legislatures violate a women’s constitutional right to privacy as defined by Justice Blackmun. 
II. Do Women Have a Constitutional Right to Privacy over Reproductive Decisions? 
The controversy around abortion is divided in two main interests: those of the state and 
those of the individual. It is important to first understand that the decisions regarding fertility and 
reproduction have not always been seen as individual rights. In some instances, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that women have a right to privacy to some reproductive decisions including but 
not limited to the right to not reproduce. However, in other cases, the Court has contrastingly 
concluded that reproductive policy may constitutionally limit women’s individual rights due to a 
compelling state interest. 
To understand the constitutionality of any decision, one must first examine the language 
used to write the law. The fundamentals of abortion and reproductive freedom regulation rely on 
the right to privacy granted by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ninth Amendment 
reads, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people”.4 The Fourteenth Amendment reads, “All persons born 
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”.5 Although the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments do not explicitly lay out the right to privacy, the Supreme Court has 
                                                        
4 "Ninth Amendment." LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed July 04, 2016. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/ninth_amendment. 
5 "14th Amendment." LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed July 04, 2016. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv. 
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traditionally accepted that the Constitution protects specific aspects of privacy in the Bill of 
Rights. In the early twentieth century, the Court came to interpret the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as protecting rights beyond those spelled out in the Bill of Rights. According to 
this privacy doctrine, the right to privacy not only protects the individual, it explicitly reduces the 
role of government power in areas such as child rearing, marriage and procreation. To 
understand how this privacy doctrine relates to reproductive decisions, we have to first go back 
to understand its roots in Griswold v. Connecticut as laid out by Jamal Green. “Justice Black 
wrote in dissent in Griswold, recognizing constitutional right of privacy ‘appears to be exalting a 
phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief.’ When Warren and 
Brandeis wrote of a right to privacy in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article, they had in mind 
civil suits against gossip- mongers and paparazzi, not constitutional defenses against abortion 
prosecutions. Privacy is protected by the Bill of Rights, Justice Douglas seemed to say in 
Griswold, but not in so many words. The right to privacy is to the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments what the right to association is to the First, an unspoken implication lying 
within the Amendment’s interstices and penumbras. Justice Douglas’s initial draft in Griswold 
did not ground the right of a married couple to use contraceptives in a right to privacy, and the 
briefs had not urged a privacy-based holding. Rather, that first draft had treated the intimacies of 
the marital relationship as protected by the First Amendment right of association”6. This 
demonstrates how the right of privacy has developed, adapted, and been molded to fit the issue 
on hand at the time. This means that the right to privacy is not as easily defined. 
These Amendments focus on a right to privacy that is inferred in the Constitution as 
inalienable to all citizens. This came from Justice Brandeis’ creating a ‘right to be left alone’ 
                                                        
6 Jamal, Green. The So-Called Right to Privacy. UC Davis. UC Davis Law Review. 
http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/43/3/liberty/43-3_Greene.pdf. 
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which developed into a right about personal privacy in the 14th amendment.7 These terms are the 
basis of the constitutionality of reproductive freedom.  
III. Justice Blackmun’s Background 
Harry Blackmun always had a disconnect with his chosen profession. The Minnesotan 
attended Harvard Law School where he found himself designated as the graduate school 
representative to live with the underclassmen Harvard students. This created a physical distance 
between him and his colleagues at the saw school campus. During his time at Harvard, he found 
that his undergraduate days were no match for his new all business atmosphere in the law school. 
While trying to balance his rigorous law courses, work, and activities, Blackmun found himself 
falling behind in his grade point average; he did not make law review, and ended up not winning 
his moot court competition. During the summers, Blackmun would return to Minnesota to work 
delivering milk to afford his next year of law tuition. Though Blackmun struggled through his 
law school journey, upon graduation, he was offered an impressive job with a Boston attorney. 
Unfortunately, his father fell sick and Blackmun instead returned home. This unconventional 
story does not seem like the making of a successful Supreme Court Justice that would impact 
lives and the future of America, but Harry Blackmun did not give up.8  
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of a Connecticut law criminalizing counseling married couples on birth control, 
Blackmun was initially hesitant about expanding the definition of the right to individual privacy 
to include marital privacy; however, he expressed a willingness to do so. As he wrote in his 
                                                        
7 Jamal, Green. The So-Called Right to Privacy. UC Davis. UC Davis Law Review. 
http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/43/3/liberty/43-3_Greene.pdf. 
8 Tinsley E. Yarborough, Harry A. Blackmun: The Outsider Justice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
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personal notes at the time, “I may have to push myself a bit, but I would not be offended by the 
extension of privacy concepts to the point presented by the present case [of Griswold v. 
Connecticut] … (if the majority reached this issue) I could go along with any reasonable 
interpretation of the problem on principles of privacy”.9 Blackmun subsequently came to agree 
with Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird, regarding a case where William 
Baird was charged with a felony for providing contraceptives to unmarried people, that “if the 
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of 
unwarranted government intrusion into… the decision whether to bear or beget a child”.10 This 
case set up a major precedent for Roe regarding the government’s role in privacy. While Justice 
Blackmun may have understood physicians’ rights and wanted to protect them, he also really 
fought for women’s rights, especially poor women. Blackmun’s ability to see this was 
demonstrated in Vuitch, in which a licensed physician was charged for violating the District of 
Columbia abortion statute by providing abortions that were not “necessary for the preservation of 
the mother’s life”, where Blackmun did not side with the physicians. He also disagreed with 
Justice Douglas who said, ‘leave to the experts the drafting of abortion laws that protect good-
faith medical practitioners’”.11 Justice Blackmun instead supported the side of the women 
seeking abortions who were being turned away due to the existing abortion statute. While many 
critics of Blackmun argue that his ties to the Mayo Clinic demonstrate absolute loyalty to 
medical professionals, cases such as Vuitch demonstrate his dedication to women’s rights. 
The right to privacy needed a push in the Supreme Court to spread across the country and 
get attention. This started first with Griswold, when it introduced this constitutional right to 
                                                        
9 Hunter, 167. 
10 Hunter, 167. 
11 Hunter, 165. 
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privacy protection. This opened the door for young academics and litigators to take reproductive 
freedom much further past just contraceptives – as they did. One major aspect of this right to 
abortion conversation is that it was the first time America publically suggested reproductive 
autonomy for women prior to 1963. Griswold changed that narrative and opened the door for 
many federal constitutional inquiries and claims filed across the country12 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roe V. Wade has had a lasting impact on American 
culture and contributed to continuing debate by grounding the decision in the right to privacy. To 
understand that effect, we have to first examine what led to these decisions and this massive but 
problematic jump toward reproductive and gender equality.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote 
the decision of Roe V. Wade and many scholars have debated what caused Justice Blackmun, 
described by all as a modest man, to make this path-breaking, bold decision. Justice Blackmun’s 
background as resident counsel for the Mayo Clinic demonstrates his positive impression of the 
medical profession and is a clear explanation for his decision.13 Certainly Blackmun’s career 
with the Mayo Clinic, where he worked as general counsel during the 1950s, would seem to 
support such a view: “Harry Blackmun’s admiration of physicians was certainly real. He ‘always 
had a sympathetic attitude toward the medical profession and for the medical mind’”.14 
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun often spoke for the medical profession and stated, “I have always 
been surprised and disturbed by the lack of sympathy that judges often have for the problems that 
confront the medical profession. I have noticed this even at conferences of our Court. I have 
done my best to alleviate that feeling… Federal judges, I have learned, do not understand 
                                                        
12 Garrow, 895. 
13 Nan D. Hunter, "Justice Blackmun Abortion and the Myth of Medical Independence." 
Georgetown Law, 2006, 147. 
14 Hunter, 151. 
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medical problems very well”.15 This sympathetic attitude might seem to suggest that Blackmun’s 
views on abortion were influenced by those of the medical professionals he worked with at the 
Mayo clinic, who did not look favorably on abortion. It is doubtful, however, that abortion was a 
significant issue for the doctors at the Mayo clinic:  “Although it is impossible to know about 
conversations there which may have touched on abortion, or what Blackmun observed or 
absorbed of staff attitudes about the procedure, normal abortions –those not involving situations 
of extreme medical urgency- were not performed at Mayo. As Blackmun himself put it, ‘The 
clinic was not, and did not wish to be, an abortion mill of any kind’.”  
Rather than focusing on Justice Blackmun’s connection to and admiration of medical 
professionals, it is more revealing to examine his views on the privacy doctrine.  
IV: The Impact of Roe 
Jane Roe challenged the constitutionality of a Texas law that prohibited abortions except 
to save pregnant women’s lives. The Court heard oral arguments twice, in December 1971 and 
October 1972, and issued its decision in January 1973. In May 1972 that is, after the first set of 
oral arguments but before the second, Justice Blackmun circulated a brief opinion in Roe that 
proposed the Court hold Texas’s anti-abortion law unconstitutional because the inclusion of only 
a maternal “life” exception was vague. Justices Brennan and Douglas expressed their differing 
complaints. At the same time, the justices were deliberating on another abortion case, Doe v. 
Bolton, in which they were asked to rule on the constitutionality of a Georgia law that outlawed 
abortion except where the mother’s life or health was seriously endangered, where the baby 
would be born with grave physical or mental defects, or in cases of rape. “In the weeks 
immediately preceding Roe and Doe’s scheduled re-arguments on October 11, 1972, Justice 
                                                        
15 Hunter, 156. 
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Lewis F. Powell Jr. gave Blackmun’s earlier drafts his first careful reading. Powell had no doubt 
that Texas’s anti-abortion law was “unduly restrictive of individual rights,” as he jotted in the 
margin of Blackmun’s Roe draft, but he also endorsed Byron White’s critique, noting “I agree 
that the Texas statute is not unconstitutionally vague.” At bottom, Powell wrote to himself, 
“Why not consolidate Texas + Ga. cases + rely on Ga. type analysis” to void both states’ statutes 
on constitutional privacy grounds”.16 Meaning, why not combine both the existing statutes of 
Georgia and Texas and determine them both constitutionally vague and open the door for new 
ideals that protected a right to privacy. 
Toward his final drafts, Blackmun began debating the dual state interests in abortion -
whether the state was protecting the mother’s health and/or protecting potential life.17 Blackmun 
moved toward balancing a woman’s privacy interests with the state’s interest in protecting the 
fetus by gradually moving away from privacy rights as the fetus becomes increasingly viable 
outside the womb. This led him to suggest that an important shift occurred at the end of the first 
and second trimesters; as the fetus gains viability, the state arguably acquires an increasingly 
compelling interest in restricting abortion. Thus, Blackmun and the justices came to focus in 
their private exchanges on “the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, 
[which] is at approximately the end of the first trimester”.18 “Thus, during the first trimester, 
before this “compelling” point is reached, a woman’s privacy right arguably should be protected 
from state interference. After this point, however, the state steadily gains an increasingly 
compelling interest in regulating and restricting abortions: ‘with respect to the State’s important 
and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because 
                                                        
16 Garrow, 907-908. 
17 Garrow, 918. 
18 Garrow, 919. 
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the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.’”19  
This idea of balancing individual rights and state interests was a large focus of the debates that 
occurred between the justices during the initial discussions and draft opinions when Roe was 
introduced. 
Roe v. Wade was influenced deeply by other abortion-related cases also going on during 
the same time such as United States v. Vuitch, Griswold v. Connecticut, and Doe v. Bolton. 
“Blackmun’s view of abortion – either as social policy or constitutional law – was deeply 
submerged in the Vuitch decision. Disagreeing with Black’s conclusion that the Court had 
jurisdiction to decide the case, he had joined a dissenting opinion by Harlan that was addressed 
solely to the jurisdictional question”.20 Blackmun used these decisions to influence the 
controversial Roe case by asking what the major legal issue was. After determining it was a 
jurisdictional issue, he was able to seek the privacy doctrine to apply to the Roe decision. These 
cases often referenced each other, “When examining Doe, ‘The court in Texas relied on language 
in the Griswold v. Connecticut decision (1965), which did not discuss abortion but held that 
married couples have a constitutional right to use contraception. Specifically, the district court 
based its abortion ruling on a concurring opinion in the Griswold case that found support for a 
right to marital privacy in the obscure language of the Ninth Amendment: “the enumeration in 
the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people.’”.21 Although Blackmun preferred to make decisions on the constitutionality of 
reproductive policy by granting exceptions to restrictive statutes based on a broad interpretation 
of health considerations, he unexpectedly moved toward embracing the right to privacy as a 
                                                        
19 Garrow, 919. 
20 Greenhouse, 77. 
21 Greenhouse, 78. 
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foundation for deciding Roe. If the majority was not inclined to decide the case by giving a broad 
definition to the health exception, he wrote, ‘then I think I could go along with any reasonable 
interpretation of the problem on the principles of privacy’.”22 This right to privacy argument was 
the major theme in Roe but came from a thorough analysis of these previous cases.  “Although 
Blackmun did not explain himself further, he was clearly aware of, and keeping the door open to, 
a line of reasoning derived from the Court’s decision six years earlier, in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, to strike down the state’s prohibition on birth control. That decision was based on 
the recently articulated “right to privacy” that lawyers challenging abortion statutes were now 
beginning to incorporate into their arguments”.23 
Blackmun was rather unpredictable on how his opinion would go. When he circulated his 
first draft of the Roe opinion, he had elected to declare the Texas statute unconstitutionally vague 
and avoided the privacy issues that Roe has raised.24 Subsequently, however, Instead, he 
declared, “‘With its sole criterion for exemption as ‘saving the life of the mother, the law is ‘is 
insufficiently informative to the physician to whom it purports to afford a measure of 
professional protection but must measure its indefinite meaning at risk of his liberty’.”25 An 
interesting point to note is Justice Blackmun’s hesitance and uncertainty in writing the Roe 
opinion. This partially came from the fact that right before Doe and Roe were set to be heard, the 
Court was at seven seats rather than the full nine pending the retirement of Justices Black and 
Harlan. This usually resulted in important cases being deferred without a full Court. To settle this 
matter, Chief Justice Burger appointed Justice Blackmun and Justice Stewart to screen the 
                                                        
22 Greenhouse, 76. 
23 Greenhouse, 76. 
24 Greenhouse, 76. 
25 Tinsley E Yarborough, Harry A. Blackmun: The Outsider Justice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008., 214. 
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pending cases and recommend which ones should go forward, and they ultimately decided to 
recommend Doe and Roe. Justice Blackmun’s lack of confidence in the decision shows because 
when those seats were filled, Blackmun asked for the two abortion cases to be re-heard because 
he thought they were important enough to have a full bench. Chief Burger never voted on 
Blackmun’s proposal, leaving Blackmun to continue on with Roe.26  
Justice Blackmun turned to many resources when considering his Roe opinion. He turned to 
the Mayo Clinic where the library staff had collected a set of books and articles on the topic of 
abortion for his research. It was noted that he found particular inspiration from the American 
Journal of Public Health for March 1971, where he found that there was a lesser risk from legal 
abortion in the first trimester than carrying the pregnancy to term. That article covered a 
surveyed perspective of abortion in state legislatures, courts, and foreign countries.27 In addition 
to the Mayo Clinic, Justice Blackmun also looked to his family for advice. “As his youngest 
daughter, Susan, described the episode later in her father’s presence, while addressing a dinner in 
his honor: “All three of us girls happened to be in Washington soon after Justice Burger had 
assigned the opinion to Dad. During a family dinner, Dad brought up the issue. ‘What are your 
views on abortion?’ he asked the four women at his table. Mom’s answer was slightly to the right 
of center. She promoted choice but with some restrictions. Sally’s reply was carefully thought 
out and middle of the road, the route she had taken all her life. Lucky girl. Nancy, a Radcliffe 
and Harvard graduate, sounded off with an intellectually leftish opinion. I had not yet emerged 
from my hippie phase and spouted out a far-to-the-left, shake-the-old-man-up response. Dad put 
down his fork mid-bite and pushed down his chair. ‘I think I’ll go lie down,’ he said. ‘I’m getting 
                                                        
26 Greenhouse,86. 
27 Greenhouse, 90. 
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a headache.’”.28 These various sources that Blackmun reached out to demonstrate his confusion 
but also his desire to truly understand the constitutionality of abortion in order to write an 
informed and accurate opinion. 
However, his uncertainty did not end once the opinion was written. Once Justice William 
Rehnquist took over as Chief Justice, Blackmun discussed the case screening committee that he 
had served on. Blackmun expressed, ‘I was on that little committee. We did not do a good job. 
Justice Potter pressed for Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton to be heard and did so in the 
misapprehension that they involved nothing more than an application of Younger v Harris. How 
wrong we were’.”29 Justice Blackmun was constantly not content with the outcome of Roe, 
knowing it would change the landscape of abortion nation-wide.  
While Justice Blackmun’s research and opinion are important to understand, often when 
analyzing Supreme Court decisions, the thinking of the Justices is primarily studied and 
examined without taking into regard the importance of public opinion. Roe v. Wade had a 
substantial influence on public opinion but public opinion also shaped the ruling itself. When 
Justice Blackmun began composing his opinion, he took public opinion into consideration. To do 
this, Blackmun turned to George Gallup on his 1972 poll on attitudes toward abortion that 
expressed two thirds of American’s stating that women and their physicians should decide 
abortion matters.30 This allowed him to scan a sense for how the pubic felt on the decision while 
he was getting torn opinions from his family and colleagues. The article reported “a ‘record high’ 
number of respondents favored ‘full liberalization of abortion laws.’  64 percent agreed, 31 
percent disagreed, and 5 percent had no opinion. There was almost no difference in responses 
                                                        
28 Greenhouse, 83. 
29 Greenhouse, 80. 
30 Greenhouse, 91. 
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between men and women. Among college graduates, support for a right to abortion was 87 
percent. A majority of Roman Catholics, 56 percent, also backed abortion rights. Among all 
demographic groups, only those whose formal education ended with grade school expressed a 
majority-view opposition to legal abortion”.31 
It wasn’t until October of 1972 when Justice Blackmun started to feel more certainty in 
his opinions. He was still unsure how the new Justices would respond but his mind was much 
clearer as he prepared for the October re-arguments. He wrote in his typical shorthand, 
“Could a state outlaw all abortions? 
Logically, on the fetal life thesis it could. 
But there are opposing interests, too, as usual. 
These deserve to be weighed. 
They are: right of the mother to life, health, physical, and mental… 
Translated this means 9th and 14th amendment rights. 
Texas exception OK so far it goes but it does not go far enough”.32 
 When contemplating the legal backing of the Roe opinion, Blackmun also took into 
account the legitimacy of the viability argument in addition to the right of privacy. Other Justices 
made their stances known to Justice Blackmun, “’Viability,’ I have thought, is a concept that 
focuses upon the fetus rather than the woman,” Brennan said. He recommended that the notion 
that the state could regulate on behalf of the woman’s health as pregnancy advances and 
‘abortions become medically more complex’ be spelled out. Viability was not relevant to that 
determination, Brennan observed. ‘then we might go on to say that at some later stage of 
pregnancy (i.e., after the fetus becomes ‘viable’) the state may well have an interest in protecting 
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the potential life of the child and therefore a difference and possibly broader scheme of state 
regulation would become permissible’.”33 This opened the door further into which interest was 
more important in the privacy doctrine – the interest of the individual, being the woman in this 
case, or the interest of the state to have a healthy and growing population. 
V: Evolution of Supreme Court Cases 
 While the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade recognized a woman’s right to make private 
choices free from state interference, by framing this in terms of privacy, the Court opened the 
door to subsequent rulings that authorized the state’s right to regulate the conditions under which 
women may exercise their right to privacy. An analysis of legal statutes and Supreme Court 
decisions since Roe reveals significant variation in legal interpretations of reproductive rights. 
On the one hand, the Court rejected a number of statutes that placed conditions on women who 
sought abortions that were deemed to have been motivated by the desire to prevent women from 
having abortions rather than due to medical considerations (Belloti v. Baird; City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health; Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists). On the other hand, the Court used the defense of abortion as a privacy right to 
argue that government bears no public responsibility for affirmatively guaranteeing this right, 
especially by providing financial assistance to cover abortion services for poor women (Harris v. 
McRae; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services; Rust v. Sullivan). While the changing 
composition of the Court explains a shift toward a greater willingness to accept restrictions on 
abortion, as explained below, part of the explanation for such decisions stems from the precedent 
set in Roe v. Wade which allowed for one protected right (a woman’s right to privacy in 
decisions about her own reproduction) to be balanced against another constitutional right (the 
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state’s right to issue regulations aimed at protecting future citizens as well as the health of 
pregnant women).  
The initial concern with abortion cases was the determination of what constituted a 
woman’s well-being and where the interests of the state lie. This concern stemmed for the 
question of what the right of privacy really means and whose interests were more important. The 
first Supreme Court ruling regarding abortion occurred in the 1971 case United States v. Vuitch 
in which Milan Vuitch, a licensed doctor who performed abortions in Washington, D.C., was 
indicted for violating anti-abortion statute that only authorized abortions necessary to preserve a 
woman’s health. Ultimately, the Court declared that the “health” exception was not 
unconstitutionally vague as long as “health” was appropriately defined to cover a women’s 
psychological and physical well-being.34 
Bellotti v. Baird in 1979 argued that the rights of a (minor) woman to have an abortion 
must be balanced with the ability of her parents to make decisions for that minor. This 
contradicted a previous decision by the Supreme Court that held a parental veto over a minor’s 
decision to terminate her pregnancy was unconstitutional. This decision wanted to balance the 
interests of the minor in terminating her pregnancy and her parents’ interests in choosing how to 
raise their offspring. 35 This was interestingly an 8-1 decision and even Justice Rehnquist insisted 
on defending privacy rights. This progressing interest of the abortion cases demonstrate that even 
the Court was torn between the two interests in abortion cases.  
In Harris v. McRae (1980), the Court argued that the right to privacy provided in Roe v. 
Wade does not compel states to use public funds to pay for poor women’s abortions. The case 
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was brought by a pregnant Medicaid recipient who argued that the Hyde Amendment that 
prevented the use of federal funds to reimburse the costs of abortions under the Medicaid 
program was unconstitutional. A majority ruled that a woman’s freedom of choice does not 
guarantee her a constitutional entitlement to financial resources. The dissenting justices on this 
case, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, argued that the Hyde Amendment’s 
denial of funding for medically necessary abortions did intrude on a constitutionally protected 
choice. It coerced pregnant women to have children they would otherwise have elected not to 
have if they could have afforded an abortion. By funding all the expenses for childbirth but none 
regarding terminating pregnancy, the dissenting opinion argued that the government forced many 
women’s hands into an offer they could not afford to refuse. While the minority insisted that the 
ruling violated the constitutional freedoms of Roe v. Wade by defining rights depending on a 
woman’s financial status, the majority denied the claim that a woman’s freedom of choice 
mandated “a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range 
of protected choices.”36  
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health of 1982, the Supreme Court 
ruled on the constitutionality of an ordinance that was enacted by Akron City Council which 
established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions, such as requiring all 
abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the 
procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a 
twenty-four hour waiting period, and the disposal of fetal remains in a "humane and sanitary 
manner."37 This case affirmed the Court’s commitment to protecting a woman’s reproductive 
rights. This case held that the City of Akron’s ordinance violated the Constitution because it was 
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intended to persuade women away from having abortions and was not motivated by medical 
considerations. 38  
Similarly, the Court ruled in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (1985) that requirements in a Pennsylvania statute restricting abortions “wholly 
subordinate[d] constitutional privacy interests and concerns with material health” and were 
aimed at discouraging abortions instead. The majority rejected provisions requiring “informed 
consent,” reporting and viability determination procedures as violations of the privacy rights of 
patients and physicians and further ruled that the requirement of a second physician for post-
viability abortions jeopardized the health of the mother by increasing delays and medical risks.39 
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services in 1989, however, the Supreme Court upheld 
similar restrictions on abortions imposed by the state of Missouri, which enacted legislation 
stipulating that the “life of each human being begins at conception” and banned public 
employees and public facilities from performing abortions, except when the mother’s life was in 
danger. The Missouri statute also prohibited abortion counseling and required physicians to 
perform viability tests upon women in or beyond their twentieth week of pregnancy. The Court 
held that Missouri was not required under due process (the requirement of the state to respect the 
rights of an individual) to enter into the business of abortion. In a split decision, the Court 
allowed Missouri to deny state resources for abortion services, concluding that the government 
had no obligation to provide accessible abortions for state residents and further concluding that 
the counseling and testing provisions were constitutional. Whereas a narrow majority had ruled 
against restrictions in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in 
1985, the composition of the Court had changed by 1989 with the appointment of Justice Sandra 
                                                        
38 462. U.S. 416 (1983) 
39 476 U.S. 747 (1986) 
 21 
Day O’Connor to the Court, who like Justice Byron White, consistently voted for restrictions on 
abortions. In addition, Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist came to support the 
argument that the rights of Missouri “as an individual” are greater than the rights of individual 
women and that the Equal Protection Clause did not create substantive rights and poverty did not 
qualify as a “suspect classification”.40 
In Hodgson v. Minnesota in 1990, the Court found that a Minnesota statute requiring the 
notification of both parents for a minor to have an abortion was unconstitutional. The Court held 
that notification of both parents did not serve a legitimate state interest and concluded that 
notifying one parent and mandating a 48-hour waiting period were both sufficient and 
constitutionally permissible, given that the statute allowed the courts to waive the parental 
notification requirement if the young woman could demonstrate that this would be unwise.41 
While the Court rejected the most onerous restrictions on abortion, it still approved the 
requirement of parental notification and a 48-hour waiting period.  
The Court’s decision in Rust v. Sullivan in 1991 regarded the constitutionality of using 
government funds to pay for family planning services under Title X of the Public Health 
Services Act. The Court held that the restrictions on funding abortion issued by the Department 
of Health and Human Services were constitutional since it was reasonable for the government to 
provide funding for preventive family planning but not for abortion services.42  
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1991 reaffirmed Roe v. 
Wade and imposed a new standard to determine validity of abortion laws. This standard asked if 
the regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden”, which is defined as a 
                                                        
40 492 U.S. 490 (1989) 
41 497 U.S. 417 (1990) 
42 500 U.S. 173 (1991) 
 22 
“substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.”43The Court upheld a law that required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period 
prior to abortions, arguing that these did not constitute substantial obstacles. Minors also were 
required to get parental permission to have abortions (although the statute also contained a 
judicial bypass procedure. The only provision that failed because it was deemed to be an undue 
burden was requirement that women had to notify their husbands before having abortions.44 
While the Court upheld a number of restrictions on abortion, thereby making the practice of 
abortions harder for women, the Court also upheld Roe v. Wade. In fact, the justices originally 
voted in conference to overturn Roe v. Wade, arguing that this case had been decided wrongly as 
abortion was not a constitutionally protected right. This anti-abortion view reflected the changed 
composition of the Court, as all of the justices who had joined the Court since Roe were 
appointed by conservative presidents. Nonetheless, Justices Kennedy, O’Connor and Souter 
carved out a middle position, reaffirming Roe but tightening regulations. 
The case of Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (1996) stemmed from 
an action filed by the Pro-Choice Network to prevent protestors from engaging in disruptive 
activities outside of abortion clinics. This led to the establishment of “fixed buffer zones” that 
prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of the entrances to abortion clinics as well as 
“floating buffer zones” that would require protestors to be at least 15 feet away from people 
trying to access the clinics. The Court ruled that fixed buffer zones were constitutional since they 
allowed protestors to be vocally heard but prevented unlawful conduct such as spitting, blocking 
doors, and attacking women seeking abortions. However, the Court determined that “floating 
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buffer zones” imposed on free speech too greatly and could actually cause more of a public 
danger.45  
Mazurek v. Armstrong of 1997 ruled on a law that only licensed physicians could perform 
abortions. This law was challenged by a group asserting that this created an undue burden on 
women seeking an abortion because at the time only one physician in the state of Montana was 
able to perform an abortion. The Court held that there was no evidence of an unlawful motive on 
the part of the state legislature and the law did not create an undue burden.46 The pattern of these 
cases following Roe v. Wade demonstrate over and over again that the Court will find loopholes 
and restrictions to prevent abortions from being tangible. This variation can be attributed to the 
contrasting interests in abortion between the individual and the state. Justice Blackmun wrote his 
opinion declaring abortions are legal due to a right of privacy, based on the evidence that the 
pregnancy is not viable in the first trimester. However, as the time passes, the right is less 
determined by viability and the privacy right is not a personal issue anymore as it takes over as a 
state interest. It is easy to determine that the Court faces a struggle to determine which interests 
take priority. Applying the constitutionality of the privacy doctrine creates an unavoidable 
argument over the extent of government’s responsibility. When talking about Blackmun’s 
decision with Roe and defining a woman’s right to abortion as a right to privacy, Blackmun 
opens a door to subsequent decisions on privacy that say that the government has no obligation 
to ensure that all women have access to safe and legal abortions. 
Overall, it is demonstrated through these cases that the dialogue about women’s autonomy in 
making her own reproductive choices has not been successful. The few success cases such as 
Roe v. Wade are quickly diminished by the overwhelming number of cases that authorize 
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restrictions on women’s reproductive choice, whether citing medical considerations or 
assessments of the viability of the fetus and the state’s right to protect future citizens. These 
variations in case decisions demonstrate the changes in social behavior that began in the 1970’s 
as there was a rise in sexual awareness and earlier sexual experimentation. When the desire for 
social change regarding reproductive rights surfaced in 1973 and Roe v. Wade was decided, 
women fighting for their bodies rejoiced. “Public opinion since the decision has remained widely 
divided. Justice Blackmun received many letters of thanks from women around the country, but 
also approximately 80,000 hate letters. Even some proponents of abortion rights have been 
critical of Roe. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has said, “My criticism of Roe is that it seemed to 
have stopped momentum on the side of change.” In other words, the decision came too soon, 
before a majority of public opinion came to support the cause. In fact, when the decision came 
down, 45 states were considering legislation to reform their abortion laws in some way.”47 
However, the dialogue quickly changed as more and more people argued this decision as 
unconstitutional and non-traditional. In response to this, without explicitly reversing Roe v. 
Wade, justices found ways to restrict women’s reproductive freedom by making abortions 
inaccessible. Ironically, women were more and more regulated rather than liberated as time went 
on. This problem comes from the court not respecting the decision of Justice Blackmun and not 
thinking of abortion as a private health matter.  
VI: Conclusion  
The law continues to regulate many aspects of American women's lives and restricts their 
reproductive freedom. The anti-choice proponents come from large sources of power such as in 
the government – through the courts, the legislature, and the bureaucratic rule making- that 
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threatens to “take away” women’s reproductive autonomy.48 The Supreme Court cases supported 
the infringement of women’s rights by restricting their access to safe and affordable abortions as 
well as their access to contraceptives. The Supreme Court has not only upheld a woman’s right 
to privacy in Roe v. Wade but subsequently has supported the infringement of reproductive rights 
which has worked to both grant and restrict women’s rights. This has been demonstrated in the 
various Supreme Court cases referenced earlier in the paper. These regulations are all based upon 
an interpretation of the Constitution that allows for the rights of women to be sidetracked 
compared to the right of privacy, the right of information, and other human rights, which are 
used to validate the ability to limit women’s reproductive freedom.49 Women have a right to 
privacy and therefore abortions are legal. This is true in the first trimester, but as the time goes 
on, the right is less and less based on the viability. Then, the privacy right is not unrestricted and 
only given during the first trimester. Therefore, we are no longer at that point talking about 
privacy anymore but talking about state interest. This is essential in determining the 
constitutionality of these legal issues presented; to balance the contrasting interests to accurate 
represent what Justice Blackmun enacted in his opinion. 
In addition, despite the fact that American society has increasingly accepted expanded 
rights for minorities and same-sex couples, it remains deeply divided over women’s reproductive 
rights, as shown by increasing legal restrictions on women’s bodies. “The differences in an 
emphasis on equality and an emphasis on autonomy fail to be recognized”.50 “Women’s bodily 
freedom (the absence of physical, legal, or social constraints on one’s decision about one’s body) 
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and the autonomy (the capacity to be self-determining, especially with respect to one’s body) are 
the sine qua non for women’s equality and full citizenship”.51  We have seen minorities become 
more accepted with affirmative action. The United States came together to fight for African 
American’s liberty by standing together to take down the Confederate flag. We have watched as 
many Americans rejoiced and celebrated as the Supreme Court ruled same-sex marriage legal in 
every state. The Catholic Church has even issued a statement accepting same-sex unions, yet it 
still considers contraceptives and abortions to be sins and cause for excommunication from the 
Church. While there are still restrictions on these groups, for the most part, they are advancing in 
society.  
The rights of women as citizens who have rights to their personal decisions have not been 
respected and have contrasted differently with the rights of other social groups. This is not just 
about fundamental religious or cultural beliefs as much as it reflects deeply entrenched gender 
views on women’s roles in society and a patriarchal sense of how women should and should not 
behave. The act of premarital sex is a sin for women but the men are never held in the same 
shameful regard. Many people have strong views on how women should behave in terms of their 
religious convictions but now also demand that everyone should be covered by these views. 
Often, these views do not reflect religious convictions, but rather they represent the gender 
norms that were translated into religious texts in the past. Recognizing a situation of real conflict 
between the survival of the fetus and the needs of the woman and those dependent on her, the 
feminist position says merely that women must decide, because it is their bodies that are 
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involved, and because they still have primary responsibility for the care and development of the 
children born.52 
These regulations against women’s reproductive freedom infringe on their ability to 
participate equally in society, limiting their rights as citizens. Reproduction affects women as 
women in a way that transcends class divisions and penetrates everything – work, political and 
community involvements, sexuality, creativity, dreams.53 Women will never be fully equal in 
society if they do not have reproductive rights. Women cannot be full citizens if they cannot 
have the right to determine when and if they get pregnant. Women’s full citizenship entails 
having the ability to participate equally in society and having the right to personal choices about 
their own body. If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting 
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.54  Control over one’s body is an 
essential part of being an individual with needs and rights, a concept, which is in turn, the most 
powerful legacy of the liberal political tradition.55 The desire for and the problems in securing 
abortion and contraception make for a shared female experience. The individual theory and 
practice of birth control stems from a biological female condition.56 Women’s roles have clearly 
grown in society in terms of the economy, politics, and the job market, yet reproductive rights 
have barely advanced over the years by still having numerous hurdles and barriers in the way 
between safe and healthy reproductive health options. Women’s control over their bodies is not 
like a preindustrial workers’ control over their tools; it cannot be wrested away simply through 
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changes in technology or legal prohibitions and repression –which is why no modern society has 
succeeded for long in preventing abortion or birth control, only in driving it “underground.”  
Women’s connection to their bodies reflects the dialectical nature of the “biological 
female condition.”57 The protection of procreative choices by means of the recognition of 
reproductive rights is necessary both to ensure that people’s lives go well and to prevent the 
misery, deprivation, and even oppression that results when people have little or no control over 
their procreative behavior. Because these rights are foundational, they cannot be disregarded or 
voided.58 Reproductive services should be seen for what they are: a category of heath care. They 
ought to be available to and accessible by potential patients on medical grounds.59 
The role of the Supreme Court is to uphold the Constitution and protect the rights of the 
citizens, which it represents. Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe v. Wade dictated that the Texas 
abortion statute should not stand and that Jane Roe’s right to privacy guaranteed her a safe and 
legal abortion. Increasingly, Supreme Court decisions enacted post Roe have moved toward 
invalidating women's right to privacy. As Republican presidents appointed new justices to the 
Court, a majority of justices came to reinterpret reproductive policy, moving away from Justice 
Blackmun's defense of privacy and personal rights and validating state laws that limited access to 
abortion. Led by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court made strides toward increasing women’s 
autonomy and reproductive freedom but continued to accept some limitations of this right. This 
set the stage for subsequent rulings that accepted more and more limitations. Although the 
Court's most recent decision in Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt rejected extensive 
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restrictions on women's access to abortion, this paper has demonstrated that such a defense of 
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